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New Orleans, Louisiana 
May 1, 1980 
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION 
OF THE 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 
AND THE NATIONAL ,LABOR RELATIONS, BOARD 
My topic concerns the overlc;tpping jurisdiction of the 
EEOC and the NLRB. By overlapping jurisdiction, I mean those 
situations where the conduct of an employer or a union may 
violate both the National Labor· Relations ~ct and Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. In these 
situations, how ~hou1d the government respond? Should both 
the EEOC and the NLRB process and investigate these~comp1aints 
and then seek or allow relief in independent forums? ·Or, 
in the interest of' ef~iciency and avoiding duplicative 
processing of complaints, should one agency cede its 
jurisdiction over the complaint to the other so that the charged 
party has to deal with a single governmental agency? 
I cannot give simple yes or no answers to these questions, 
but I will share with you a consideration that influences my 
answers. In preparation for today, the most overwhelming 
impression I came away with after studying overlapping 
jurisdiction is that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
and the National Labor Relations Board should work more closely 
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together to eliminate invidious employment discrimination. 
Our two agencies must bet,ter utilize 'e'ach other t s resources 
and expert~se. We in government and the academic communit~ 
• , 
need to focus on how agency collaboration can further the 
respective missions of both the EEOC and the NLRB. The 
very nature of the government, however, precludes a quick 
response to this challenge. In the interim, this paper 
sets out in a cursory fashion how the EEOC and NLRB have 
re'sponded to discrimination issues, labor-management decisions 
of particular interest to the Commission, and issues on which 
the two agencies differ and agree. 
1. BACKGROUND. 
Beginning in 1935, and continuing for approximately 
the ,next thirty years, the National Labor Relations Act 
was the dominant piece of legislation in the field of labor 
law. There was, of course, activity under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act such as minimum wage, overtime and child labor 
disputes and there was litigation under various state Fair 
Employment Laws. The bulk of labor practice, however, was in 
the labor-management area. 
In 1964, a far-reaching piece of civil rights legislation 
was passed. One of the sections of that Act, commonly referred 
to as Title VII, makes it unlawful for employers, unions, 
and employment agencies to discriminate against employees and 
job applicants on the basis of race, color, sex, religion or 
national origin. It is safe to say that Title VII law now 
, . ~ . 
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shares pre-eminence with the law under the NLRB, and that 
these are the two dominant areas of labor law. 
·1 The Irowth of Title VII law is nothing short of 
t 
phenomenal. There has never been anything like it. In 1964 
Congress anticipated that, the EEOC in its first year of operation, 
1965-1966, would receive approximately 2,000 char~es. Nearly 
9,000 charges were actually filed ,the first year. From there 
the number grew exponentially. In fiscal year 1976, nearly 
95,000 charges were filed. Title VII.require~ th~,~~OC to 
investigate each of these charges. 
In 1976 the Commission refined its charge intake 
procedure and cut down the number of charge filings. 
According to the annual reports of both the EEOC and the NLRB, 
during fiscal year 1979 the National Labor Relations Board 
receLved approximately 41,000 unfair labor charges and 13,500 
complaints dealing with election representation questions for 
a toa1 of 54 to 55,000 complaints. During the same period, 
EEOC received approximately 69,000 Title VII charges, 2,000 
age complaints and another 400 equal pay complaints for a 
total of approximately 72,000 complaints. Additionally, 
according to estimates of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, approximately 5,500 civil rights 
employment discrimination cases were filed in Federal District 
Courts in fiscal year 1979. 
At this time, no one knows how many Title VII charges 
also raise issues under the National Labor Relations Ac~ nor do 
we know how many complaints filed with the NLRB raise Title VII 
i . 
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issues. However, given the heavy volume of disputes under 
each Act, it is probable that there aTe' substantial numbers 
of complaint~ filed raising factual and substantive issues 
. i 
t , . 
relevant to or controlled by the law or policies of both 
the NLRB and the EEOC. 
2. ELIMINATING-DISCRIMINATION THROUGH COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING PROCESSES: EEOC INITIATIVES 
On March 25, 1980, the Commission passed a resolution 
which in brief recognizes good faith efforts by a union or 
employer to negotiate specific equal employment opportunity 
provisions as terms and conditions of a collective bargaining 
agreement without the cooperation of the other party. 
In recognition of this situation, the resolution states that 
the Commission will take into account the lack of culpability 
I 
of this innocent party and refrain from bringing suit against 
it; the Commission will sue the other party to the collective 
bargaining agreement.~t 
~/ It should be noted that the gravamen of the resolution 
is contained in Paragraph 3. At this time, the resolution 
merely instructs the staff to develop, amend, and modify 
written instructions to the field staff that clearly reflects 
that criteria necessary to establish the standards of "good 
faith" ... In all instances, no administrative case 
processing or enforcement actions shall be invoked under the 
resolution, unless "approved ... by the Commission." Until 
the staff presents standards to carry out the intent of the 
resolution, existing policies remain applicable, in my view. 
r \. 
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~he Commission believes that this resolution is in 
keeping with the Supreme Court's holding in Weber (United 
SteelworkeJs of America v. Weber, 99 S.Ct. 272 (1979). 
r 
In Weber, the Court held that labor and management should 
be provided with a climate conducive to the voluntary 
elimination of unlawful employment practices. The Commission 
feels that through the resolution it is providing an incentive 
for parties to collective bargaining con-tracts to voluntarily 
eliminate discriminatory practices. 
Some observers felt that in the pas·t EEOC too often 
included in an enforcement action as a defendant, the very 
party -- be it labor or management -- that had argued 
that a discriminatory practice be corrected. To their 
dismay, these parties often found themselves as co-defendants 
with the'all~ged wro~gdoer. After.furtli.er staff 
consideration the EEOC may now refrain from prosecuting these 
parties if they have in good faith attempted to eliminate 
discriminatory practices. The Commission defines a good 
faith effort as those "actions of a compelling and aggressive 
nature evaluated on a case-by-case basis.1t The Commission 
instructed the General Counsel and the Office of Field 
Services to develop written instructions for implem~nting this 
policy. 
I voted for this resolution because I believe: 
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(1) the elimination of employment discrimination 
is an urgent national goal, however achieved. 
~ee Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415 u.s. 36 
I 
. '(1974) ; 
.(2) despite progress in eliminating discrimination 
from the workplace, it still exists; discrimination 
is pervasive, deep rooted, intractable; 
(3) the more fronts the government can bring to bear 
on this problem, the sooner our society will truly 
be just and'fair .. 
I share my colleagues' view that this resolution is' 
another weapon in the battle to eliminate employment discrimination. 
Yet even with these feelings, I nonetheless had an uneasiness 
about the resolution. Initially, I was hesitant ~o vote for 
it because I felt there we're· some troublesome areas in the 
I 
collective bargaining processes which had not been sufficiently 
explored requiring more study prior to the vote on the resolution.~/ 
Indeed, if not handled' correctly, adverse consequences 
could flow from this resolution -- the most serious being 
"forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the 
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce . . " Such 
eventualities ,would of course impair collective bargaining 
~/ To this end, while the staff back-up memorandum was 
published by the trade press, the Commission did not vote on 
or approve the staff paper. 
, " 
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and thwart the very purpose of the National Labor Relations 
Act. This wesolution will raise some difficult questions for 
J 
the Commission: . whether "actions of a compelling and 
agressive nature" means that a union ,should strike rather 
than accede to discriminatory terms? To escape Title VII 
prosecution,. should a union be compelled to first inform 
an employer that if it does not alter a policy the union 
will file a Title VII charge against the employer? Should. 
the standard be that if an employer is unable to negotiate 
with a discriminatory labor organization, the employer 
should refuse to bargain with the uni'on and risk an unfair 
labo~ charge? On the otherhand, if parties to a 
collective bargaining. contract do not have to take. actions 
anywhere approaching the gravity of those listed above, than 
the Commission may have relinquished its prosecutorial 
discretion for little in return. 
To properly implement the collective bargaining resolu-
tion, the Commission should fully understand all those cir-
cumstances in which EEO issues arise during the collective 
j, 't ' 
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bargaining processes. Under the resolution,~'at a minimum, 
Commission staff is going to have to secure a greater apprecia-
tion of the dynamics involved in collective bargaining just to 




to be. I believe 'one possible consequence of this resolution 
is that the EEOC may become or be called upon to become more 
involved in labor-management disputes. The Commission may file' 
more amicus briefs before the National Labor Relations Board or 
actually intervene in the administrative process so that our 
views are on record. 
-:..' One of my personal concerns, is the extent to which the EEOC 
may 'make a "good faith" determination comparable to the NLRB 
'''good faith" standard without a hearing mechanism -- since good 
faith is solely a question of fact. Is "good faith" as we have 
used the term in the resolution really comparable to the use of 
that term under NLRB policy? In the context of the administra-
tive processing of a charge during which good faith becomes an 
issue -- should that charge be settled during fact finding? By 
voting to absolutely require ourselves to take good faith into 
account, i~ nationwide or regional bargaining where the give-
and-take in the collective bargaining process is critical to 
reach accord and industrial peace, will we really have theinvestiga-
tOl:Y capacity to', :r-ev.iew"'a p:s;'o,ces's whi'ch' -maY; coveJ:i.~ nUmber of months 
and during whicc' certain equal employmerit opportuntty gains may 
have been achieved, but not in the area subject to the charge in-
vestigated? Will the good faith-notion become 'a oottom line 
concept? By using the term good faith in the manner applied by 
the NLRB, will the EEOC create a judicial. standard for review or 
de novo hearings, which could effect its own prosecutorial discre-
tion? Ought the EEOC be careful not to adopt a good faith 
principle like the NLRB if the nature of the good faith doctrine 
is to reach a common agreement as opposed to one focusing on 
"specific terms"? Could EEO fall within a specific term cate-
gory? In areas where the Supreme Court has limited the scope of 
the, good faith doctrine, as, exercised by the Board, if the EEOC uses 
this standard do we run the risk of waiving our discretionary 
power to sue or by this policy do we create an affirmative defense 
which may shift the burden of persuasion to the EEOC? Hopefully, 
these questions will be considered by the General Counsel, Field 
Services and Policy Implementation arms of the EEOC in any future 
proposals made to the Commission. 
4 • 
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3. THE NLRB'S RESPONSE TO RACE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION 
.ISSUES 
.1 A. Bekins - Handy Andy i 
i 
The NLRB has consistently taken a strong and vigorous 
approach on discrimination issues arising in the context of 
unfair labor charges. However, t~e Board retreated from an 
activist approach in dealing wit~ equal employment opportunity 
issues in the context of representation proceedings. Bekins 
Moving and Storage Co. of Florida, Inc., 211 NLRB 138 (1974) 
• 
and the Board's subsequent reversal of that decision only,cwo 
and a half years later in Handy Andy, 228 NLRB 447 (1977), 
illustrates the retrenchment. 
By way of background, Bekins and Handy' Andy both had 
their genesis in two earlier cases' -- one decided by the 
Supreme Court the other by the Eighth Circuit. In Steele v. 
f 
Louisville & Nashville Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), a union which 
was the bargaining agent for a group of railroad workers 
entered into an agreement with an employer which virtually 
prohibited blacks in the unit from working solely because of 
their race. The Supreme Court ruled that the union, as the 
bargaining representative of ali. :enip'loyees' 'in' a··grveri· unit,- must 
act for all members of that class "without hostile discrimination, 
fairly, impartially and in good faith", and cannot sacrifice 
the interests of minority and women workers. The union has 
a duty of fair representation. 
The Eighth Circuit' s decision in NLRB v.' Mansi'on House 
4 • 
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Center Management, 473 F.2d 471 (1973), actually set the stage 
for the Bek~ns-Hand Andy controversy. In Mansion House, the 
Board rule that the company" s failure to bargain with the' 
union was an unfair labor practice. The Board then petitioned 
the Court of Appeals for enforcement of its order to the 
company to bargain. The company's defense to the NLRB 
petition was that the union was dis,criminating. The Eighth 
Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order and stated: 
the remedial machinery of the National 
Labor Relations Act cannot be available to a 
union which is unwilling to correct past practices 
of racial discrimination. Federal complicity 
through recognition of a discriminating union 
serves not only to condone ,the discrimination, 
but in effect l~g:i:t"i.:mizes and perpetuates s'uch 
invidious pra,ctices. Id at 477, 
Hence, the Eighth Circuit held that the enforcement machinery 
of the Board and the Courts could not, consistent with the 
constitutional requirement of equal protection, be made 
available to discriminating unions. The court felt that 
enforcement of a Board order in favor of a discriminating 
union was analagous to court enforcement of a restrictive 
convenant outlawed by the Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kr'aemer, 
334 U.S. I (1948). 
• 
ABA - 11 
The Board's decision in Bekins Moving expanded the 
rationale of Mansion House -- that the Constitution precludes the 
1 
NLRB from b.~sto~i.ng any. benefit on·a dtscr":i:1llinating union. · 
The Board in Bekins declared that not only would it refuse 
to aid unions which discrimina.ted bu t that even if a dis-
criminating union was selected by a majority of workers in 
the bargainins unit, the Board might refuse to certify it 
as the ·official bargaining unit. Bekin-s Moving and Storage 
Co., 211 NLRB 138 (1974). 
In its ruling, the Board instructed employers that 
after the vote in the bargaining unit they could file an 
objection to union certification based on discrimination and 
that this objection would be analyzed in the same manner as 
any other conduct objected to affecting an election. The 
Boara would then determine on a case-by-case basis whether 
evidence of discrimination voided a union election victory. 
Bekins meant that unions'racial and sexual practices 
frequently could come under close scrutiny. 
Bekins was criticized on many fronts. Some thought 
the decision contrary to the National Labor Relations Act 
itself because the Board was suggesting that it would with-
hold certification of a labor organization even though it 
had been selected by a majority of the unit employees. The 
agreement here was that this procedure would violate Section (7) 
rights of employees -- the right to bargain collectively 
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through representatives of their own choo~ing. Another 
criticism was that employers exploited the Bekins holding 
1 
by injecti~ charges of discrimination as a delaying , 
tactic so as to avoid collective bargaining altogether 
rather than being sincere in their efforts to eliminate 
discrimination. Finally, some observers feit that the 
constitutional underpining of the decision was simply wrong. 
They argued that Board certification of a union was not 
government enforcement or government approval of union 
activity and hence, there was no state action restricted by 
the Fifth Amendment. 
The Board embraced these criticisms in Handy Andy, 
228 NLRB 447 (1977) and reversed·Bekfns. Handy Andy held 
that the Board was not constitutionally required to 
cons'ider allegations about a union' s discriminatory practices 
in a representation proceeding. The Board said that while 
certification conferred some benefits on a union, the Board 
by certifying a union was not placing its imprimatur on ~ny 
union conduct "lawful or otherwise. 1f Certification meant 
only that in a given unit the majority of employees had 
selected their bargaining representative. No ."state action" 
was involved. 
B. Discrimination Issues in the Con"t'e"xt'o"f Un'fa'ir 
Labor Practices 
The Board has and continues to take forceful action 
against employers and unions which practice unlawful discrimination. 
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Handy Andy stated only that the Board would refrain from 
hearing disctimination issues in representation proceedings. I .. 
, ' 
The decision emphasized that discrimination could and should 
I . 
be raise.d in the context of unfair labor practice proceedings. 
This area simply does not lend itself.to a brief 
discussion. Suffice it to say that an employee can charge 
their bargaining representative with'unfair labor practices 
where the union has violated its duty of fair representation. 
For example, in Independent Metal Workers Union, Local No.1 
(Hughes Tool), 147 NLRB 1573 (1964), the Board held that 
where a union refused to process the grievance of a black 
worker in the bargaining unit solely because of his.race, 
the union has breached the duty of fair representation and has 
.' 
violated 8(b)(l)(A), 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(3) of the National , 
Labor Relations Act. In Pacific Maritime Association, 209 
NLRB 599, the Board held a union violated Section 8(b) (1) and 
8(b)(2) of the NLRA by breaching its duty of fair representation 
when it refused to refer women because of their sex to 
employment through the union's hiring hall. Of course, where 
employers have discriminated, they too have been found guilty 
of unfair labor practices. See, e.~:g~';~ Farmer'S:" 'Coo~pe·r'a·tlve 
Compress, 194 NLRB 85 (1971). 
c. An Unfair Labor Practice as a Violation of Title V~I: 
Issue of Dual Remedies 
Although I have found no cases directly on point, I 
believe that a charging party is free to file a Title VII 
• 
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charge ,against his or her bargaining representative and at 
the same time exercise his or her rights under the National 
Labor Relatiins Act and charge the union with discrimination 
r 
and violating the duty of fair representation. The principle 
of dual remedies was recognized and approved by the Supreme 
Court in a related context in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. , 
415 U.S. 36 (1974) (invocation of 'procedures under a collective 
bargaining contract do not preclude a charging party from 
filing a Title VII charge against the employer.) 
4. UNION ACCESS TO EMPLOYER EEO RECORDS 
The Board has ruled that unions ,can secure an employer's 
EEO records if their collective 'bargaining contract with the 
employer contains a non-discrimination clause. In 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 139 NLRB No. 19 (1978), the 
Board' held that a union was entitled to secure statistical data 
on minority and female employees and all EEO charges involving 
unit employees .::~:I Westinghouse also held that although the 
union could not secure the company's affirmative action 
program,which ,is required of all government contractors, the 
union was entitled to the underlying statistical data. In a 
related case, the Board ruled that ,the union was entitled to the 
race and sex of job applicants at the company. ' E'ast' Datt'on Tool 
& Die Co., 239 NLRB No. 20 (1978). 
~/ The petition for enforcement in Westinghouse is presently 
pending before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals - Nos. 
78-2067, 2262, Nos. BO-llBl, 82, B3. 
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These two decisions are important to the Commission 
because they make valuable profile information available to 
labor organizations. The Commission needs to know whether unions 
i 
are taking ladvantage of the West'in'ghouse decision and requesting 
, . 
EEO charges, workforce profiles, and statistical data. How 
this information will be utilized is particularly important 
in light of the previously discussed Commission resolution 
regarding elimination of discriminatory practices through 
collective bargaining. Since unions can secure EEO information 
only in limited situations,will they be able to complain to 
the EEOC that the~ were uninformed on a particular practice? 
Indeed, if information is power than the Commission may be 
able to better evaluate good faith bargaining on the part 
of unions, or the lack thereof. 
5. UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND RELIGIOUS 
",' ACCOMMODATION;" THE NLRB" S'GENERAL COUNSEL 
AND EEOC TAKING OPPOSING POSITIONS 
,-- , 
Although there would appear to be an enormous potential 
for conflict between interpretations of the National Labor 
Relations Act and the Commission t s interpretati'on of Title 
VII, there has been minimal conflict. The one area where the 
two agencies have taken opposing positions is on union security 
agreements and Title VII's duty to accommodate religious·beliefs. 
The problem arises because some employees have religious beliefs 
which do not allow them in good conscience to join or financially 
support labor organizations. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA 
permits employees and unions to agree that all employees must 
pay union dues as a condition of continued employment. The 
unions feel that all of those who receive the benefits of its 
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representa~ion and advocacy should contribute to the union 
and pay dues. 
Section 703(c) of Title VIr prohibits employers and 
unions from discriminating on the basis of religion. In 
/ 
1972, whe~ Co~gress amended Title VII, it added Section 79l(j) 
which states that the duty to refrain from discrimination on 
the basis of religion includes an obligation to accommodate 
the religious beliefs of employees, unless doing so-would 
create undue hardship. 
The NLRB's General Counsel, however, has taken the 
position before the Board in Scandia Log Homes, 1-9~CA;"10.925l 
that since the NLRB protects union security agreements, 'Section 
701(j) does not preclude the discharge of an employee with 
religious objections to joining a union in a shop which has a 
union security agreement, regardless of the possibility of 
accommodation without hardship. The General Counsel points to 
the specific exemption for health care institutions under Section 
19 of the NLRA as proof that Congress did not intend any other 
employees covered by a union security clause to be exempt from 
the mandatory payment of dues. 
The EEOC has filed an amicus brief with the Board point-
ing out that the General Counsel's position has been rejected by 
all three Circuit Courts of Appeals which have addressed the 
issue. See Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 
1976) cert. denied sub nom.; International Association of Machinists 
and Aerospace Workers v. Hopkins, 433 u.s. 908 (1977); McDaniel v. 
Essex Internation-al, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978); Anderson v. 
General Dynamics, 589 F.2d 397 (9th eire 1978). 
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Also, Congress is now focusing on this "apparent 
conflict. It The House has already passed H.R. 4774 which would. 
~ 
amend the ~ational Labor Relations Act. This provision 
would apply to all employees who can show membership in a 
bona fide religion which has historically held conscientious 
objections to joining or financially supporting a union. 
The bill allows these persons to refrain from joining or 
paying dues to a union on the condition that they pay an 
equivalent amount to charity. H.R. 4774 is still pending 
before the Senate. 
6. IDENTICAL APPROACHES TO ISSUES ARISING UNDER 
-. BOTH-THE-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND ..... ---r-.. -
TITLE VII 
• ____ ••• _ ••• '4' 
The issue of successor corporations and attendant 
liability arises under both the NLRA and Title VII. Indeed, 
in one of the earliest Commission enforcement actions, .EEOC 
found itself suing a successor corporation. The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the successor because 
the charging party had only filed charges of discrimination 
against the predecessor. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that since the focus of the NLRA and Title VII were 
similar -- extending protection to workers -- the principle 
of successorship utilized in NLRA cases should also control 
Title VII cases. The Appeals Court therefore· reversed the 
dismissal but cautioned that just as in NLRA cases, the 
liability of a successor must be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. EEOC v. MacMillan Blo·edel, 503 F .2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1978). 
· ~ ", 
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The EEOC has also urged the courts to follow the 
standards promulgated by the NLRB for determini~g whether 
" 
separate cofporate entities in fact constitute a single 
r 
employer. Since Title VIIts jurisdiction does not attach 
unless an employer has 15 full time employees, the issue 
of holding separate corporate entities as one is especially 
significant. In' Baker v. S'tuart'"B'r'oa"dc'a's'tlhg Co., 560 
F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1977), the Commission found that a 
communications firm owned several radio ,stations and had" 
incorporated each individually and ,that no single unit 
employed fifteen workers. The Court, at the EEOC's urging, 
adopted the NLRB's standard for consolidating separate 
entities and held there was Title VII jurisdiction. 
7 • PROTESTING DISCRIMINATION' AND E~1PLOY.ER RETALIATION 
The Commission and the NLRB recognize that employer 
retaliation undermines the very operation of their respective 
statutes. Employees will be reluctant to assert their r~ghts 
if an atmosphere of fear pervades. They must feel free to 
protest violations of Federal labor laws. The cases below 
demonstrate ~he interplay of Title VII and the National Labor 
Relations Act irr this area. 
A. Emporium Capwell 'Co. v. Waco, 420 U. S, 50 (1975) I 
is the leading NLRA case deali~g"with employee protests 
over discrimination. In that case, a department store had 
a collective bargaining ~greement with a union of store clerks 
and stock persons. The agreement recognized that the union 
was the sole collective bargaining agent for all covered 
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employees and it prohibited discrimination. 
A group of black employees believed that certain 
company employment practices were racist and that the 
~ 
r 
collective bargaining grievance procedures were 
inadequate to remedy this problem. These employees began 
to picket the store and demanded to meet with the top store 
management. The company fired the protesting employees after 
they refuse~ to cease their activities and as a result a 
complaint was filed against' the company alleging that its 
conduct was retaliatory and violated 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.· 
In Emporium the Supreme Court defined the issue before 
it as whether the employees' attempt to engage in separate 
bargaining was protected by Section 7 of the Act or proscribed 
by9(a). The Court decided' in favor of the employer. It 
notep that the Board had found that the union was doing 
everything it possibly could under the grievance procedures 
to remedy discrimination. It reasoned that the employees' 
conduct was not protected because it was in derrogation of 
the union's status as the designated exclusive bargaining 
representative. The Court noted that even assuming the 
company's conduct violated Title VII's prohibition against 
retaliation "the same.·'eonduct",is· 'not -necessar.ily. entitled 
to affirmative protection from the NLRA." 
B. King v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 476 F.Supp 
495 (N.D. Ill. 1978)raddressed the other side of the issue, 
specifically whether conduct protesting discrimination in 
contravention of a collective bargaining agreement is protected 
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by the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, Section 704. 
In King, a ~lack male joined a picket line during work hours 
~. 
outside his/employer's plant protesting his company's 
racial policies. According to the collective bargaining 
agreement, work stoppages were prohibited. After being 
ordered to return to work,' King continued to picket and 
was fired. Thereafter, King filed a Title VII charge 
claiming his employer retaliated against him. 
Relying on Emporium, the district court rej~cted the 
contention that 704(a)'s right to oppose employment discrimina-
tion included the use of a strike prohibited by the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement. The Court held that 
if King's work stoppage was protected by 704(a) the union's 
promise not to strike would have been devalued and ultimately 
the collective bargaining process would be impaired. 
c. The Federal government needs to be more attentive 
to the increasing tendency of workers to dual file charges 
with Federal agencies. This is especially true with regard 
to retaliation charges. For example, in a non-union setting, 
if a worker protests his or her employer's discriminatory 
wages and is then retaliated against and files a complaint 
with both the EEOC and the NLRB, what are· 'approp;riate 
agency responses? Two independent statutory violations may 
have occurred -- the employee's 8(a)(1) right to engage in 
concerted activities and Title VII's 704(a) right to oppose 
discrimination. In this· day-of higher costs and the need for 
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more efficient management, should one agency cede its jurisdic-
tion so as to avoid duplicative investigations?, 
.( 
ExJcutive Order 12067 authorizes the Commission to . 
t ' 
coordinate the Federal government's civil rights efforts. 
EEOC is to consolidate overlapping interests wherever it can 
appropriately do so. I certainly do not believe the 
situation I posed above falls within the scope of this 
Order. Furthermore, in view of the important s~atutory 
rights involved, I would feel ill at ease if one agency 
refused to invoke the full extent of its own jurisdiction'if by 
dO~!l9 so the 'publ'±'c, good' :achieves' 'immediate 'and res'olute 'elimination 
of discrimination. On the other hand, I feel that in these 
days of higher costs and the need for more efficient allocation 
of resources, it is important to air the issue. It warrants 
study. 
CONCLUSION. 
The EEOC and the NLRB are vested with independent 
legislative mandates--the interes'ts of' which 'overlap. I'n 
programs and coordination. both agencies must, and I am sure 
will, exercise the full power of the law to eliminate the 
badges of slavery and all forms of discrimination. Over-
lapping jurisdictional interests are not per se contrary to 
the notion of governmental efficiency. It is ignorance of 
the processes and falling short of our mandate to eliminate 
discrimination that is inefficient. The EEOC and the NLRB 
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should strive to work more closely-to avoid falling short. 
j 
f 
